9e538d2809
二、门禁与唤醒(新插件 dsh-plugin-team-ledger 0.2.0)
宿主 Agent Teams 缺两块能力,补在独立仓
D:/Code/AI/dsh-plugin-team-ledger:
- 状态存放:<工作区>/.dsh/team/gate.jsonl 追加账本,记验收
清单、实测证据、认领历史,跨重启存活;canonical JSON +
fsync,坏尾行截断恢复。
- 唤醒模型:门禁推进后按事件计划唤醒下一责任人,借活体
Lead 作 caller 走宿主 sendMessage;无定时器;30 分钟滑动
窗口限 4 次防复活风暴。
- 验收独立性由机器强制:执行人/历史认领者不能 accept,
checklist 逐项 passed=true 缺一不可。
- team_member_revive(Lead 专用):成员模型路由死亡后的
复活通道——可换 provider/model,再经 subagents.sendMessage
冷恢复唤醒,绕过宿主 roster 的 phase=active 门禁。
二、角色绑定跨重启还原(roles fork 0.5.2)
persona 与工具白名单只有运行中 agent 的内存态,宿主重启后
冷恢复的成员既无 persona 也无白名单——实测出现 doc-writer
成员带全量工具面(qq_*/ImageGen),属静默权限放大。改为
注入成功时持久化 childId -> {roleId, cwd} 到
~/.dsh/role-inject-bindings.json,并在 agent/created 时重放。
追加 team_member_rebind 补绑定,覆盖 0.5.2 之前已存在的成员。
三、配套
- .dsh/roles 八个角色白名单加入门禁工具;AGENTS.md 委派策略
补门禁/复活/重绑三套操作口径。
- docs/环境与部署/子Agent角色自动注入实现说明.md 新增
§5.1,记录绑定机制、存量成员缺口与「成员自省不可全信」的
台架教训。
157 lines
6.0 KiB
JavaScript
157 lines
6.0 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* Tool-policy normalization for ONE delegation.
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*
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* A role declares a tool policy (`tools` shorthand or `toolFilter`). Before the
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* child is published the entries are expanded against the delegating agent's
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* CURRENTLY VISIBLE tool names, because the child's `tools.restrict()` rejects
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* an unknown name by throwing inside the child's creation window — an MCP
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* server that has not finished registering yet would otherwise turn every
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* delegation into a hard failure.
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*
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* Glob entries (`*`, `?`) expand to the concrete matches; literal entries that
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* are not visible are reported so the caller can warn (`onMissingTool: 'drop'`)
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* or refuse (`'error'`). An `allow` list that expands to nothing is passed
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* through as an explicit empty allow list — fail closed, never silently widen.
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*/
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/** Whether a policy entry is a glob rather than a literal tool name. */
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export function isGlobPattern(entry) {
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return entry.includes('*') || entry.includes('?')
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}
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/**
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* Names the registry can expose but `tools.restrict()` refuses to accept.
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* `run_code` is the PTC presentation transport: `schemas()` lists it, while
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* `restrict()` throws on it by name.
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*/
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const UNRESTRICTABLE_TOOL_NAMES = new Set(['run_code'])
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/**
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* Whether a visible tool name must be kept out of every role policy.
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* @param name - tool name from the registry view.
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* @returns whether `tools.restrict()` would reject it outright.
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*/
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export function isUnrestrictableToolName(name) {
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return UNRESTRICTABLE_TOOL_NAMES.has(name)
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}
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/**
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* Extract the tool names the core complained about, so one delegation can drop
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* them and retry instead of failing with an error the model cannot act on.
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* @param error - the thrown value from `subagents.start` / `restrict()`.
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* @returns the offending names, deduplicated (empty when unrelated).
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*/
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export function parseUnrestrictableToolNames(error) {
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const text = String(error?.message ?? error ?? '')
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const names = []
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const unknown = /names unknown global tools? ((?:"[^"]+"(?:,\s*)?)+)/.exec(text)
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if (unknown !== null) for (const match of unknown[1].matchAll(/"([^"]+)"/g)) names.push(match[1])
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const reserved = /cannot name reserved PTC mode presentation transport "([^"]+)"/.exec(text)
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if (reserved !== null) names.push(reserved[1])
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return [...new Set(names)]
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}
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/**
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* Copy a normalized filter without the named entries. An explicit `allow` list
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* is preserved even when it becomes empty (that still means "no tools").
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* @param filter - normalized filter.
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* @param names - names to remove.
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* @returns the reduced filter, or undefined when nothing effective remains.
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*/
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export function dropToolFilterNames(filter, names) {
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const drop = new Set(names)
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const next = {}
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if (filter?.allow !== undefined) next.allow = filter.allow.filter((name) => !drop.has(name))
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if (filter?.deny !== undefined) {
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const deny = filter.deny.filter((name) => !drop.has(name))
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if (deny.length > 0) next.deny = deny
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}
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if (next.allow === undefined && next.deny === undefined) return undefined
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return next
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}
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function escapeRegExp(character) {
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return character.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&')
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}
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/**
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* Compile one glob entry into a whole-name regular expression.
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* @param pattern - glob text.
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* @returns the compiled matcher.
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*/
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export function globToRegExp(pattern) {
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let source = '^'
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for (const character of pattern) {
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if (character === '*') source += '.*'
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else if (character === '?') source += '.'
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else source += escapeRegExp(character)
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}
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return new RegExp(`${source}$`)
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}
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/**
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* Expand one role tool policy against the visible tool names.
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* @param filter - `{ allow?, deny? }` as declared by the role.
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* @param visibleNames - tool names visible to the delegating agent.
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* @param options - `onMissing`: `drop` (default) or `error`.
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* @returns `{ filter?, missing, unmatched, dropped }`; `filter` is undefined
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* when nothing effective remains.
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* @throws when `onMissing` is `error` and any entry could not be resolved.
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*/
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export function expandToolFilter(filter, visibleNames, options = {}) {
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const visible = visibleNames instanceof Set ? visibleNames : new Set(visibleNames ?? [])
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const missing = []
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const unmatched = []
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const dropped = []
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const expand = (entries) => {
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const names = []
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for (const entry of entries ?? []) {
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if (!isGlobPattern(entry)) {
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if (visible.has(entry)) {
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if (!names.includes(entry)) names.push(entry)
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} else {
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missing.push(entry)
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dropped.push(entry)
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}
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continue
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}
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const matcher = globToRegExp(entry)
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const matches = [...visible].filter((name) => matcher.test(name)).sort()
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if (matches.length === 0) {
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unmatched.push(entry)
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dropped.push(entry)
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continue
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}
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for (const name of matches) if (!names.includes(name)) names.push(name)
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}
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return names
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}
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const hasAllow = filter?.allow !== undefined
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const hasDeny = filter?.deny !== undefined
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const expanded = {}
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if (hasAllow) expanded.allow = expand(filter.allow)
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if (hasDeny) {
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const deny = expand(filter.deny)
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if (deny.length > 0) expanded.deny = deny
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}
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if (options.onMissing === 'error' && (missing.length > 0 || unmatched.length > 0)) {
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const known = [...visible].sort().join(', ') || '(none)'
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const problems = [...missing.map((name) => `"${name}"`), ...unmatched.map((name) => `"${name}" (glob matched nothing)`)]
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throw new Error(`subagent-roles: tool policy names unavailable tool${problems.length > 1 ? 's' : ''} ${problems.join(', ')}; visible tools: ${known}`)
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}
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if (expanded.allow === undefined && expanded.deny === undefined) return { missing, unmatched, dropped }
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return { filter: expanded, missing, unmatched, dropped }
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}
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/**
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* Sum the schema characters of the named tools, for budget diagnostics.
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* @param schemaCharsByName - tool name to serialized-schema length.
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* @param names - the names to sum.
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* @returns the total character count.
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*/
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export function sumSchemaChars(schemaCharsByName, names) {
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let total = 0
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for (const name of names) total += schemaCharsByName[name] ?? 0
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return total
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}
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